The Reform of Article 432-12 of the French Criminal Code: Toward a More Restrictive Definition of Unlawful Conflict of Interest

A few months before the municipal elections of March 2026, Law No. 2025‑1249 of 22 December 2025 establishing a status for local elected officials was enacted with the stated objective of encouraging local political engagement and strengthening the appeal of local mandates.
Originating from a bill introduced in the Senate on 18 January 2024, this initiative seeks to address concerns voiced by local elected officials by securing their professional path and improving the conditions under which they carry out their local mandate.

In addition to measures aimed at increasing compensation, improving the reimbursement of certain travel expenses, and facilitating career transitions for elected officials, this highly anticipated text also clarifies the definition of unlawful conflict of interest as set out in the French Criminal Code.

As highlighted by Christophe Vigouroux, Honorary Division President at the Council of State, in a report entitled “Securing the Action of Public Authorities in Compliance with Legality and the Principles of Law”, submitted to the Prime Minister on 13 March 2025, the proposed amendment to the Criminal Code sought to address the “criminal risk” experienced by public decision‑makers in the daily exercise of their responsibilities. This risk is particularly evident in litigation relating to unlawful conflict of interest, which accounts for nearly 40% of prosecutions and convictions against public officials.
It is precisely in response to this finding that Article 30 of the law of 22 December 2025 amends Article 432‑12 of the Criminal Code in order to narrow the scope of the offence of unlawful conflict of interest. It now provides that:

“The act, by a person holding public authority or entrusted with a public service mission, or by a person vested with an elective public office, of knowingly taking, receiving or retaining, directly or indirectly, an interest that impairs his or her impartiality, independence or objectivity in a company or in an operation for which he or she is responsible, in whole or in part, at the time of the act, for supervision, administration, liquidation or payment, is punishable by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of €500,000, which may be increased to twice the proceeds derived from the offence.
An interest shall not constitute an interest within the meaning of this article if it is a public interest or any interest whose consideration is excluded by law.
The offence defined in this article is not established when the person referred to in the first paragraph could not have acted otherwise in order to address an overriding reason of public interest.”

First, the legislator more clearly reaffirms the intentional element of the offence by adding the phrase “knowingly.” The perpetrator must be fully aware that the interests they hold are capable of impairing their impartiality, independence, or objectivity in the exercise of their public duties.

Next, the reference to an interest “likely to compromise impartiality, independence, or objectivity” is replaced by the term “impairing,” which requires that the interference be effective and concrete. This objectification means that unlawful conflict of interest can no longer be established based solely on the appearance of a conflict; rather, a genuine showing of material interference must now be demonstrated.

Furthermore, a new paragraph expressly excludes public interests from the scope of criminal liability, specifying that a “public interest” (or any interest excluded by law) does not constitute an interest within the meaning of Article 432‑12. As a result, an elected official cannot incur criminal liability solely for defending a public interest that differs from that associated with their mandate. This amendment reflects the recommendations of the Vigouroux report, which stressed that “the criminalisation of situations involving two opposing public interests is not justified.” It is therefore a welcome safeguard for public decision‑makers, marking the end of prosecutions in cases where only public interests are at stake. Going forward, only interactions between public and private interests will be considered.

Finally, Article 30 introduces a ground for criminal exemption when the elected official or public agent “could not act otherwise in order to address an overriding reason of public interest.” This could be the case, for example, of a mayor compelled to urgently award a contract to a company operated by a relative to respond to a disaster, where that company is the only one capable of intervening effectively in the very short term. Recommended by the Vigouroux report, this exclusion seeks to protect administrative action when public decision‑makers face situations in which recusal is impossible. This addition is not without consequence for the criminal courts, which will now be responsible for interpreting the still‑undefined notion of an “overriding reason of public interest,” potentially requiring them to assess the appropriateness of public decisions.

Ultimately, by refocusing the offence of unlawful conflict of interest, the law of 22 December 2025 strengthens the protection of public decision‑makers facing criminal risk. However, the redefinition of the elements constituting the offence, together with the introduction of new grounds for exemption, will require gradual interpretation by criminal courts tasked with determining their concrete scope.

Subscribe to the newsletter to stay informed about upcoming developments