Management Packages in France: What the 2025 Tax Reform Means for You

  • Analysis
  • Tax law
31.03.2025

This uncertainty led to audits and litigation, as detailed in a recent analysis published by Pierre Bonamy for the IBA, in april 2025 (see article).

With the 2025 Finance Bill, that uncertainty is finally addressed. A new legal framework — Article 163 bis H of the French General Tax Code — introduces a clear and predictable regime for taxing gains from management packages. Here is what you, as a senior executive or manager, need to know.

A Clear Framework Replaces Case-by-Case Uncertainty

Historically, whether your gain was taxed as capital or salary depended on complex factual criteria: performance conditions, contractual clauses, risk allocation, and more. Even instruments normally viewed as safe (e.g. free share allocations or stock options) came under scrutiny when ratchet mechanisms inflated gains (See details).

Under the new regime, all management instruments are covered — whether statutory (AGA, BSPCE, stock options) or bespoke (warrants, preference shares) — under a unified rule (See details).

The approach is binary:

  • Gains below a defined threshold are taxed as capital gains at ~34%.
  • Excess gains are taxed as employment income at progressive rates (up to 45%) plus a 10% special social contribution (See details).

How the Threshold Is Calculated

The threshold above which gains are taxable as salary is determined as follows:

Threshold = Purchase Price x Exit Value / Entry Value – Purchase Price

Where:

  • Exit Value = fair market value of the issuing company on the date of the disposal of the shares or any event treated as a disposal, after adjustment for debt (see below);
  • Entry Value = fair market value of the issuing company at the date of acquisition, subscription, or attribution of the shares, after adjustment for debt (see below); and
  • Purchase Price = actual price paid by the employee or manager to acquire or subscribe to the shares (for free shares, refers to the value crystallized at the end of the vesting period, as reported for social security purposes).
  • Exit Value and Entry Value have to be adjusted for debt: the issuing company’s fair market value must be adjusted by adding back any debts owed to shareholders or related companies (within the meaning of Article 39, 12 of the French Tax Code).

Debts created after acquisition are deemed to exist from the acquisition date for Entry Value purposes.

The text uses a net-asset approach and states that the FMV is deemed to correspond to the actual value of the company’s equity, increased by related-party debt, as explained above.

Example:
A manager receives a package in consideration for salaried functions. When she receives her package, the issuing company is worth EUR 100M. When she exits, the same company is worth EUR 200M. She invested EUR 100K and she exits for EUR 1M, leading to a gain of EUR 900K.
The threshold is equal to EUR 500K, i.e.,100K€ x 2 x 3 - 100K€, where 2 is the multiple of the issuing company.
As a result, EUR 500K is treated as capital gain and the remaining EUR 400K is treated as salary.

A New Legislative Framework: Article 163 bis H of the French Tax Code

At first, practitioners decided that legally recognized instruments – such as free shares (AGA) and stock options or share warrants (including BSPCE) – were safe. The logic was the following: the tax administration could not use the link with the salaried or management functions to requalify the gains because such a link was a legal prerequisite to granting those instruments.

However, over the last couple of years, tax audits have targeted legally recognized instruments (mostly AGA) when the underlying shares used ratchet mechanisms leading to the aggressive accretion of the managers’ financial rights in case performance criteria were met.

In any case, the absence of clear statutory guidance created legal uncertainty and led to a surge in tax audits and litigation.

To address this legal limbo, the 2025 Finance Bill introduces a new legal framework, codified under Article 163 bis H of the French General Tax Code (CGI), applicable from 15 February 2025.
This reform aims to provide clarity by creating a dedicated regime for gains realized on securities acquired or granted in consideration for salaried or management functions (whether in the issuing company, its subsidiaries, or its parent entity).

Scope: All Management Instruments Now Captured in the Net

The scope of the new regime is deliberately broad. It covers all instruments typically used in management packages—regardless of whether they are structured within legally recognized plans (AGA, stock options, BSPCE) or bespoke instruments (such as share warrants or “BSA”, preference shares, etc.).

While statutory instruments retain their specific treatment upon grant or exercise, the new regime applies to the capital gain portion when such gain is considered to arise from the recipient’s corporate role, and provided it exceeds a certain threshold.

A Clear Philosophy: Certainty over Litigation

The new regime replaces the previous ambiguity with a binary approach:

  • Up to three times “the multiple of financial performance”, the gain qualifies as capital gain, taxed at a flat rate (usually around 34%);
  • Beyond that threshold, the excess portion is treated as employment income, subject to progressive tax (up to 45%), potentially to the contribution on high income (up to 4%) and to a new 10% special social contribution (but excluded from standard employer social charges).
  • This regime is aimed at providing legal certainty.

Previously, taxpayers had to argue—often with little success—that the gain was disconnected from their employment or management functions.

Now, there is no need to engage in complex factual assessments. Either the threshold is not exceeded, and the gain is capital gain, or it is exceeded and there is a split between capital gain and salary.

It should however be said that capital gain taxation is only available when there is a real risk of loss for the manager. As a result, a favorable price formula guaranteeing that the manager will receive more than her purchase price means that the whole gain will be taxed as salary.

Criticism from some Private Equity Players

Some private equity market players are not fully satisfied with this logic, as they would have wished to retain the possibility to consider a package as purely capital gain, regardless of its performance.
In other words, they would have wanted to be able to “take their risk”.

However, this strategy is increasingly daring, and arguably unnecessary. Three-times the multiple of financial performance already makes room for sizable upside for managers.

Cross-Border Issues: Open Questions

As a reminder, when instruments such as stock options, free shares or BSPCE are issued in a cross-border context, OECD recommendations and French guidelines dictate that gains must be split into two distinct components:

  • The gain realized upon exercising the instrument, treated as employment income, falling under Article 15 of the OECD Model Tax Convention.
  • The gain arising from the sale of the shares acquired through the instruments treated as capital gains falling under the provisions of Article 13 of the OECD Model (Capital Gains), or under Article 21 (Other Income) if the treaty does not contain a capital gains article.

At first, there was no clear answer as to how to deal with the part of the gain exceeding the threshold of three times the multiple. Should it be taxed in the State of residence as capital gain, or should it be taxed at source as employment income?

Choosing the latter could lead to a qualification conflict between France and the State of residence and, possibly, double taxation. Choosing the former could defeat the purpose of the new regime in an international context.

A similar uncertainty arises when considering the exit tax. When a taxpayer leaves France, the exit tax applies to her latent capital gains.

However, when stock options and other free shares are involved, the exit tax does not apply to the fraction of the latent gain which is treated as employment income (since, in most cases, the right to tax will be allocated based on where the beneficiary effectively carried out its activities during the vesting period).

Then, the question is: when the beneficiary of a French package leaves France, what will happen to the share of the (latent) gain which is over threshold and, as such, taxed as salary?

Very recently, the French Treasury has let it be known that, both for the exit tax and under bilateral tax treaties, the entire gain—including the slice above the three‑times multiple threshold—was to be treated as employment income.

A written (and binding) confirmation is expected in guidelines to be published this May 2025.

In practice, however, some cross‑border frictions are expected to remain: for example, some countries view package gains as capital gains and tax them accordingly, giving rise to potential double taxation for French‑package beneficiaries residing there, on the share treated as employment income in France.

Deferral Regime: a major Pain Point, in the process of being resolved

One of the most critical issues of the 163 bis H article concerns the inapplicability of capital gain deferral mechanisms.

Articles 150-0 B and 150-0 B ter of the French Tax Code provide for a deferral which apply when shares are contributed in kind – i.e., in a share for share exchange.

While Article 163 bis H explicitly allows the portion of the gain treated as a capital gain (i.e., within the “3x performance multiple” cap) to benefit from the usual deferral rules in case of qualifying contributions (e.g., contribution to a holding company in exchange for shares), the excess portion treated as salary is immediately taxable, even in the absence of liquidity.

This presents a serious cash-flow concern, particularly in LBO contexts where managers are required to reinvest their proceeds as part of the transaction.

In practice, the manager may be taxed on a salary portion at up to 59% (45% maximum rate for income tax, plus 4% of potential contribution on high income, plus 10% of special social contribution), even though no cash has been received at the time of the transaction—putting pressure on their ability to fund the reinvestment.

In this regard, another technical uncertainty arises regarding double taxation risks when the deferral from article 150-0 B is applied: when the previously taxed salary portion is eventually realized upon a second exit, can it be deducted from the capital gain then realized? The law is silent, but fairness would suggest that a mechanism should prevent economic double taxation.

Fortunately, discussions with the French Treasury indicate that the portion of the contribution gain taxed as salary may also benefit from deferral.

At this stage, it is likely that such change would be introduced in an upcoming Finance Bill with retroactive effect to February 15, 2025.

Social Security: A Manager’s Burden and a Corporate Risk

While the new regime exempts employers from traditional social contributions, it introduces a 10% special contribution borne by the manager.

However, if a manager disputes the application of the regime, claiming a capital gain instead of employment income and is later reassessed by the tax authorities, the employer could face full social security reassessment, including back-charges, penalties, and interest.

As a result, contractual clauses should be introduced in management packages, requiring managers to comply with the new rules and report the employment income portion appropriately.

Conclusion: A Welcome Step Forward

In sum, this reform marks a positive shift for the French tax framework applicable to management incentives. Despite unresolved technicalities, the core philosophy—predictability over subjectivity—should be welcomed by international investors and executives alike.